FLORIDA: “Florida Court Calls Ban on Gay Adoptions Unlawful”
10.01.2010 | Adoption
By: John Schwartz read »
UTAH: “Navajo Nation can’t fight adoption of tribal kids”
10.01.2010 | Adoption
By: Brooke Adams read »
NATION: “Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption Names America’s 100 Best Adoption-Friendly Workplaces”
10.01.2010 | Adoption
By: Staff Writer read »
NATION: “Study: Foster children struggle to learn”
10.01.2010 | Child Protection / Foster Care
By: Ledyard King read »
NATION: “Shortage of foster parents seen as U.S. trend”
10.01.2010 | Child Protection / Foster Care
By: Marisa Kendall read »
OHIO: “Ohio Supreme Court: Sellersburg couple can keep son for now”
10.01.2010 | Adoption
By: Matt Thacker read »
WASHINGTON D.C.: “HHS awards $39 million to states for increasing adoptions”
09.23.2010 | Adoption
By: Staff Writer read »
NEW YORK: “NY law lets unmarried adults jointly adopt”
09.23.2010 | Adoption
By: Associated Press read »
PENNSYLVANIA: “Report: Number Of Pa. Kids In Foster Care Declines”
09.23.2010 | Child Protection / Foster Care
By: Staff Writer read »
CONNECTICUT: “Federal judge to hear Conn. DCF oversight case”
09.23.2010 | Child Protection / Foster Care
By: Staff Writer read »
- § 2251. Sexual exploitation of children
- § 2251A. Selling or buying of children
- § 2252. Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors
- § 2252A. Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography
- § 2252B. Misleading domain names on the Internet
- § 2252C. Misleading words or digital images on the Internet
- § 2253. Criminal forfeiture
- § 2254. Civil forfeiture
- § 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries
- § 2256. Definitions for chapter
- § 2257. Record keeping requirements
- § 2257A. Record keeping requirements for simulated sexual conduct
- § 2258. Failure to report child abuse
- § 2258A. Reporting requirements of electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers
- § 2258B. Limited liability for electronic communication service providers, remote computing service providers, or domain name registrar?1
- § 2258C. Use to combat child pornography of technical elements relating to images reported to the CyberTipline
- § 2258D. Limited liability for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
- § 2258E. Definitions
- § 2259. Mandatory restitution
- § 2260. Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States
- § 2260A. Penalties for registered sex offenders
HHS Awards $39 Million to States for Increasing Adoptions
WASHINGTON–The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services today awarded $39 million to 38 states and Puerto Rico for increasing the number of children adopted from foster care. States use the funds from this adoption incentive award to improve their child welfare programs.
“America’s communities benefit when children grow up in stable families”
“All children deserve loving, safe and permanent homes,” said HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius. “It is gratifying that most states continue to excel in promoting the adoption of children from foster care. I sincerely thank every adoptive family that has welcomed a child into their home.”
States receive $4,000 for every child adopted beyond their best year’s total, plus a payment of $8,000 for every child age 9 and older and $4,000 for every special needs child adopted above the respective baselines. The year 2007 is the baseline.
This year’s incentive award recipients completed more adoptions in 2009 than in the 2007 baseline year.
“America’s communities benefit when children grow up in stable families,” said David A. Hansell, HHS acting assistant secretary for children and families. “We’re very pleased that the adoption incentives program is helping states improve their programs and place more children into homes that are theirs forever.”
States and territories receiving today’s funding are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico.
A list of each state’s adoption incentive award amount can be found at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2010/fy10_adoption_incentive_awards.htm.
Note: All HHS press releases, fact sheets and other press materials are available at http://www.hhs.gov/news.
Sexual Abuse Laws
Links to Sexual Abuse Laws:
US Codes: Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children
~ Title 18, Part I, Chapter 110 [offsite]
US Codes: Sexual Abuse
~ Title 18, Part I, Chapter 109A [offsite]
US Codes: Sexual Exploitation & Other Child Abuse
~ US Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 110, Section 2252 [offsite]
US Codes: Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity
~ Title 18, Part I, Chapter 117 [offsite]
State Websites [search state laws].
This information may be extracted, edited, and/or paraphrased from government publications.
The website host is not responsible for the source or accuracy of information.
People v. Sanchez
114 Cal.Rptr.2d 437
Court of Appeal, 3rd District, California, 2001
FACTS: In August of 1997 Sanchez’s neighbors went to his property because a calf had been bawling loudly for 2 or 3 days and could be heard by neighbors a mile away. The neighbors found animals living in hideous conditions. The calf was tied to a post, unable to get any food or water. Eight rabbits were caged without food or water, 4 were dead and 4 were dying. The bodies of several dead ducks, chickens and geese were scattered about. A corpse was being eaten by a dog. In June of 1998, an animal control officer went to Sanchez’s property and found several severely malnourished geese. He opined that they may have been without food or water for up to a month. Other neighbors testified that at unspecified times, they saw a chicken tied around a dog’s neck, they saw Sanchez firmly kick dogs with steel-toed boots for no apparent reason, they found a burn pit at the back of the property containing dead and dying calves and chickens, and saw dead cows, starving dogs, and dead rabbits. In 1999, a police officer went to the property where he found a dead peacock in a pit and a pig’s head attached to a tree. In June of 1999, the same officer found a puppy with one dead eye and a deeply infected hole between its eyes, which was full of live maggots that were moving and eating inside the wound. The puppy was impounded and euthanized. Sanchez was arrested and charged and convicted of multiple counts of animal cruelty. He appealed 7 of the counts. At issue was the requirement of a unanimity instruction. A unanimity instruction is used when the State charges one crime but relies on multiple acts to support that one crime. When multiple acts are alleged the jury must be unanimous as to which act or incident constitutes the crime.
ISSUES: Whether animal abuse may be committed as a continuous course of conduct, and when so committed requires no unanimity instruction; whether a unanimity instruction was required with respect to the count alleging cruelty to dogs in view of evidence of 2 separate incidents each of which established the offense; whether unanimity instructions were required as to counts alleging that defendants had abused rabbits, ducks, chickens, and geese, as each was based on a continuous course of conduct; whether a unanimity instruction was required with regard to the count alleging defendant’s failure to provide any medical treatment for the severely wounded puppy.
1) A unanimity instruction must be given where the evidence shows that more than one criminal act was committed which could constitute the charged offense, and the prosecution does not rely on any single act.
2) A unanimity instruction is not required where the criminal acts are so closely connected as to form a single transaction or where the offense itself consists of a continuous course of conduct.
3) An offense is of a continuing nature when it may be committed by a series of acts, which if individually considered, might not amount to a crime, but the cumulative effect is criminal.
4) When the language of the statute focuses on the goal or effect of the offense, the offense is a continuing offense.
5) Animal abuse may be committed as a continuous course of conduct, and when so committed requires no unanimity instruction.
6) Unanimity instruction was required with respect to count alleging cruelty to dogs in view of evidence of 2 separate incidents each of which established the offense, so this count was reversed.
7) Unanimity instructions were not required as to counts alleging that that defendant had abused rabbits, ducks, chickens, and geese by failing to provide adequate food and water on ongoing basis, as each count was based on a continuous course of conduct.
Deason v. State
881 So.2d 58
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, 2004
FACTS: On December 9, 2002, appellant Deason was visiting a home where pigs were kept in the backyard. Deason and three other individuals were allegedly in the front yard when they heard a pig squealing in the backyard. Everyone went to the backyard, where they found a pig that had been stabbed in a cage. When deputies arrived at the scene, they observed “Big Bob” lying on his stomach attempting to pull the injured pig out of the cage. He had a knife in his hand, but it was not the knife that had been used to stab the pig. Deason was still present, wearing clothes that were covered in pig feces, mud, and what appeared to be blood stains. Animal control was called to euthanize the pig, and Deason was arrested. No one testified that they saw Deason stab the pig, and the only physical evidence linking him to the crime was the reference to blood on his clothes. Deason attempted to introduce evidence that “Big Bob” was a confidential informant for the sheriff’s office in order to establish bias on the part of the deputies. The State objected and the trial court ultimately sustained the objection. Jury found Deason guilty of cruelty to animals and attempted inhumane slaughter of an animal. Deason appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred by prohibiting Deason from establishing bias on behalf of the deputies by introducing relevant evidence that “Big Bob” was a confidential informant in unrelated cases.
HOLDING: Yes, the evidence that “Big Bob” was a confidential informant was relevant. The evidence should have been presented so that the question of whether it establishes bias could be resolved by a jury.
Cotton v. State
589 S.E.2d 610
Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2003
FACTS: Appellants Thomas and Gloria Cotton appeal from their joint conviction for allowing livestock to roam at large, and Thomas Cotton also appeals his conviction for cruelty to animals. In April 2001, a deputy from the sheriff’s office went to investigate a report that cattle were without drinking water. The deputy observed cattle and calves in a small pen, the ribs on some of the cattle were showing, and they were without food and water. When the deputy released the cattle from the pen, they ran frantically to a nearby mud puddle to drink water. The livestock inspector who accompanied the deputy to the site described the cattle as in very poor physical condition and suffering. According to a neighbor who lived by the property on which the Cottons kept their cattle, frequently ten or fourteen days would pass before the Cottons came to check on the cattle. The trial court found both Thomas and Gloria Cotton guilty of the livestock running at large charge. The trial court also found Thomas Cotton guilty of cruelty to animals. The Cottons appeal these convictions.
ISSUES: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Thomas Cotton’s conviction for cruelty to animals and whether the trial court erred in finding Thomas and Gloria Cotton guilty of the civil statute relating to livestock running at large.
HOLDINGS: Yes, the evidence was sufficient to support Thomas Cotton’s conviction for cruelty to animals. Yes, the trial court did err in finding Thomas and Gloria Cotton guilty of the civil statute relating to livestock running at large; this is a civil statute, which does not impose criminal liability.
Sirmans v. State
534 S.E.2d 862
Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2000
FACTS: Appellant Sirmans and his family live on a farm where they raise cows, chickens, ducks, goats and hogs. In April 1998 the humane society director contacted the sheriff’s office regarding complaints that both departments had received about Sirmans’ alleged neglect of his animals. The humane society director drove past Sirmans’ property where she observed farm animals that appeared to be deprived of food and water in plain view of the roadway. After reporting her findings to the sheriff’s office, several humane society employees, two sheriff’s deputies, a veterinarian and the humane society director went to Sirmans’ farm to investigate further. Sirmans refused to allow them to look around his property; however, the large animals were in plain view and had no food and water. They loaded the animals that were in the worst shape onto trucks and transported them for veterinary care and shelter. The trial court convicted Sirmans of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. He appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Sirmans’ motion to suppress evidence; 2) whether the humane society employees were subject to constitutional restrictions on search and seizure of private property; 3) whether the warrantless search of Sirmans’ property and the seizure of his animals was authorized under the plain view exception; 4) whether the trial court erred in overruling Sirmans’ motion to sever the assault charge from the animal cruelty charges; 5) whether the trial court had the authority to deprive Sirmans of those animals which the state failed to prove were abused.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence. Sirmans affirmatively stated at trial that he had no objection to the admission of the evidence, and so his right to contest the admission of the evidence on appeal was waived. 2) Yes, the humane society employees were acting as agents of the county and in concert with the sheriff’s department in seizing Sirmans’ animals, and thus were subject to constitutional restrictions on search and seizure on private property. 3) Yes, the warrantless search and seizure was authorized under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 4) No, Sirmans was not entitled to severance of the assault charge from the animal cruelty charges. Though the assault is not directly related, it is unlikely to have occurred if Sirmans had not neglected his animals. 5) No, the trial court was without statutory authority deprive defendant of those animals which the state failed to demonstrate were neglected or abused.
State v. Larson
941 S.W.2d 847
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, 1997
FACTS: Dr. Larson is a veterinarian and a farmer who owned and operated a hog farm. On August 2, 1995, the sheriff’s department received reports of stray hogs. After unsuccessfully trying to contact Larson, the deputy sheriff went to Larson’s farm and returned the stray hogs. The deputy sheriff observed that the hogs were emaciated. Two days later the sheriff’s department received more calls regarding stray hogs. Based on the deputy sheriff’s observations from August 2, a warrant to search Larson’s property was obtained. During the search, the deputy sheriff and two veterinarians observed bad flooring in parts of the farm building, abundant refuse from the disposal system, a “sickening odor,” the remains of approximately 250 dead hogs, and live hogs displaying various stages of malnutrition. Larson was charged with fifty counts of Class A misdemeanor animal abuse and fifty counts for failure to properly dispose of dead animals. He filed a motion for bill of particulars. The trial court denied the motion, and Larson was convicted on all counts. He appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Larson’s motion for bill of particulars; and 2) whether the deputy sheriff’s entry onto Larson’s property in order to notify him of the stray hogs, and the subsequent search warrant that was issued were unlawful.
HOLDING: 1) Yes, the trial court did err in denying Larson’s motion for bill of particulars. Counts 1 through 50 were not sufficiently detailed to inform Larson of the pig to which they were referring. Therefore, conviction on counts 1 through 50 was reversed and remanded for a new trial with the prosecution to provide a bill of particulars on each animal. 2) No, the deputy sheriff’s entry onto Larson’s property and the subsequent search warrant were not unlawful. The “plain view” doctrine is applicable because dead and malnourished hogs were visible to the deputy sheriff before he entered the property. Conviction on counts 51 through 100 for improper disposal of dead animals was affirmed.
State v. Sheets
677 N.E.2d 818
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Highland County, 1996
FACTS: Appellant William Sheets was charged with cruelty to animals for failing to provide sufficient quantities of food to ten horses. Sheets had one hundred and twenty-two horses on his property, and after a search of his farm, the Highland County Humane Society seized all one hundred and twenty-two. The trial court found that when the Humane Society seized nine of the horses for which Sheets was charged with cruelty to animals, they were located on the Adams County portion of Sheets’ farm. Sheets pled no contest to the nine charges of cruelty to these horses. Sheets contested the tenth cruelty to animals charge, the charge of cruelty to a horse named Jamala Christie. Trial court found Sheets guilty of cruelty to Jamala Christie. Defendant appeals all of the charges.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court erred in overruling Sheets’ motion to suppress evidence resulting from the search of his farm; 2) whether the search warrant issued by the Highland County court was valid for the Adams County portion of his farm; 3) whether trial court erred in requiring Sheets to surrender all one hundred and twenty-two of his horses even though he was only convicted of cruelty to ten of these horses; 4) whether the trial court erred in overruling Sheets’ motion for acquittal involving the cruelty to Jamala Christie.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the trial court did not err in overruling Sheets’ motion to suppress evidence resulting from the search of his farm. The affidavit established probable cause for a warrant to search Sheets’ farm. 2) Yes, the search warrant issued by Highland County was valid for the Adams County portion of the farm. Sheets did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the pasture area of the Adams County portion of the farm, and therefore no search warrant was necessary to search that area. 3) No, the trial court did not err in requiring Sheets to surrender all one hundred and twenty-two horses. The conditions of probation were not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion because the probationary conditions had a relationship to the crime of which Sheets was convicted. 4) No, the trial court did not err in overruling Sheets’ motion for acquittal regarding Jamala Christie because there was reasonable evidence to support this conviction.
State v. Lapping
599 N.E.2d 416
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Trumbull County, 1991
FACTS: Appellant Lapping, an osteopathic physician, purchased farmland with the intent of raising cattle. Knowing little about the cattle business, Lapping purchase twenty-eight head of beef cattle over a period of six months. In March 1990, the sheriff’s department received information that there was a dead cow floating in a pond on Lapping’s property. After obtaining a search warrant, humane officers entered Lapping’s property to check on the cattle. They found the dead cow in the pond, another dead cow next to the barn, and most of the rest of the cows in a pasture with no hay and sparse grass. The humane officers believed that all of the animals looked thin. They confiscated all of the animals, providing them with food, water and medical treatment. Lapping was charged with thirty counts of cruelty to animals. The trial court denied his request for a bill of particulars, and the case proceeded to jury trial. One of the counts was dismissed, and appellant was convicted of twenty-eight of the remaining counts of animal cruelty. Trial court denied Lapping’s motion to treat the twenty-eight counts as allied offenses. Lapping appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether a failure by the prosecuting attorney to provide a bill of particulars as to the specific animals that were alleged to be mistreated. 2) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that animal cruelty is a strict liability crime, which does not require a showing of intentional or reckless activity.
HOLDING: No. In this instance the state did not possess the specific information requested by the appellant as the cruelty charged took place over a period of time and the appellant better knew when that cruelty occurred. Yes, the trial court did err in instructing the jury that cruelty to animals was a strict liability offense. The court held that the animal cruelty statute was not a strict liability statute based on the principles of stare decisis. The decision was remanded due to the improper jury instruction.
State v. Hafle
367 N.E.2d 1226
Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Clinton County, 1977
FACTS: Appellant Hafle and his wife moved from their residence in Missouri to a twenty acre farm in Ohio, bringing with them forty head of beef cattle, a horse, and two sheep. Nine months later, the director of the humane society received a complaint from the neighborhood about Hafle’s neglect of his cattle. The director and a member of the humane society went to Hafle’s farm, talked to him, and inspected the cattle and the premises. The director and member returned to the farm again the next day and again two days after that to inspect the animals and get the matter worked out. At this time Hafle said that he would sell some of the cattle to a neighbor and take the rest to the stockyards by February 27, the following day. On February 28 the cattle were still on Hafle’s farm. The humane society then had all of the livestock removed from Hafle’s property in accordance with an order prepared in the local solicitor’s office. Hafle was convicted of cruelty to animals and he appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the cruelty to animals statute under which Hafle was convicted was unconstitutionally vague; 2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence hearsay testimony of statements made by Hafle during a custodial interrogation; 3) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the cruelty to animals statute was not unconstitutionally vague. 2) No, the trial court did not err in allowing the hearsay testimony as evidence because of the inapplicability of Miranda to misdemeanors and because no interrogation took place. 3) Yes, there was not only adequate but overwhelming evidence to sustain the conviction.
Com. v. Barnes
629 A.2d 123
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1993
FACTS: In May 1991, David Philipe, an environmental inspector with the Erie County Health Department, went to appellants David and Alice Barnes’ horse farm. Philipe went to investigate a complaint concerning odors coming from the farm. When he arrived at the farm, no one was home. Philipe did notice a strong odor of dead or rotting animals though, and after walking around the farm, he saw the carcasses of dead animals, including two horses. Looking into the barns, he saw several horses that appeared to be uncared for and undernourished. Philipe notified David Barnes of his violation of health Department regulations, and also informed Merle Wolfgang, chief cruelty officer of the Erie Humane Society, of his findings. Wolfgang then went to the Barnes’ farm the next day and found conditions to be as Philipe described. When Wolfgang returned a few days later, intending to obtain the Barnes’ permission to search their farm, they informed her that they had given the horses away. As she was leaving the farm though, Wolfgang saw several sick and malnourished looking horses in a nearby field. She learned that the Barnes were renting the field. Wolfgang then obtained a search warrant, and removed seven horses from the field. A farrier and veterinarian examined the horses and concluded that they were suffering from numerous, severe, chronic health problems. David and Alice Barnes were found guilty of ten counts of cruelty to animals. They appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where they were convicted of seven counts of cruelty to animals. Their post-verdict motions were denied and they appealed.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the statutory grant of police powers to the Humane Society was an improper delegation of governmental authority; 2) whether the statutory provision under which the Barnes were convicted is unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process; 3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Barnes’ convictions.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the statutory grant of police powers to the Humane Society was not an improper delegation of governmental authority. The actions of the Humane Society agents were regulated and constrained; the agents could be considered police officers because they had been given the power to arrest when acting within the scope of their employment; their searches were reasonable; the agents were paid employees and so they are not shielded from liability by the “good Samaritan” statute. 2) No, the statutory provision under which the Barnes were convicted is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process. There is a statutory exception for activity which is “undertaken in normal agricultural operations,” however the Barnes’ utter neglect of the horses does not fall within the exception. 3) Since the Barnes’ neglect of their horses does not fall within the “normal agricultural operations” exception, their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.
State v. Gadreault
758 A.2d 781
Supreme Court of Vermont, 2000
FACTS: On December 3, 1997, a search of defendant Gadreault’s property revealed three frozen dead pigs in an unsheltered pen in six inches of liquid manure. There was also a calf tethered to a fence post that appeared weak and to have difficulty standing. Gadreault was charged with four counts of animal cruelty in violation of Vermont’s animal cruelty statute. Jury found Gadreault guilty of three counts of cruelty to animals. Gadreault appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the court erroneously excluded the intent element from the crimes with which Gadreault was charged; 2) whether the court denied Gadreault the right to a speedy trial; 3) whether the search warrant was unlawful because the information upon which it was based was illegally obtained; 4) whether Gadreault’s sentence was excessive; 5) whether Gadreault’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not allowed to assist his attorney, the State failed to call a particular witness who was present at the search of the house, and the judge should have been recused because he was acquainted with Gadreault.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the court did not err in excluding the intent element. The statute’s subsections do not include an intent element; therefore the Legislature intended that offenders be held strictly liable. 2) No, Gadreault has not identified any prejudice to his defense, thus there is no violation of his right to a speedy trial. 3) No, the search warrant was not unlawful because Gadreault did not identify anything in the record to show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. 4) No, Gadreault’s sentence was not excessive because there is nothing in the record to show that he preserved this issue for appeal. 5) There is insufficient information with which to address these issues.
M. L. B. v. S. L. J.
519 US 102, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as “of basic importance in our society,” rights sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. This case, involving the State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demanded the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important was at stake.
Santosky v Kramer
455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
Lassiter v Department of Social Services
452 US 18 (1981)
The Court’s decisions have by now made plain that a parent’s desire for and right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is an important interest that “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.
Quilloin v Walcott
434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended “if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.” Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the “best interests of the child.”
Smith v Organization of Foster Care Families
431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster parents and a foster parents organization, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against New York State and New York City officials, alleging that the statutory and regulatory procedures for removal of foster children from foster homes violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The ruling contains an analysis of the rights of natural parents as balanced against the rights of foster parents, as well as a comprehensive discussion of foster care conditions.
Moore v East Cleveland
431 US 494 (1977)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters have consistently acknowledged a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced.
Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur
414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
Stanley v Illinois
405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and protection. The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, and the 9th Amendment.
Wisconsin v Yoder
406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights of Amish parents to provide for private schooling of their children, the Court held: “The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”
Loving v Virginia
388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial marriage, the Court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Pierce and Meyers, finding that marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. “The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”
Griswold v Connecticut
381 US 479 (1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” The Court referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a “right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.” Reaffirming the principles set forth in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska.
Prince v Massachusetts
321 US 158 (1944)
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
Skinner v Oklahoma
316 US 535 (1942)
“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”
Pierce v Society of Sisters
268 US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children was abridged by a proposed statute to compell public education. “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”
Meyer v Nebraska
262 US 390 (1923)
“No state … shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
“While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program
The United States Drug Enforcement agency is working on a way to manage prescription drug abuse in this country.
Here are a few questions and answers from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Diversion regarding the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.
1. What is a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP)?
According to the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws (NAMSDL), a PDMP is a statewide electronic database which collects designated data on substances dispensed in the state. The PDMP is housed by a specified statewide regulatory, administrative or law enforcement agency. The housing agency distributes data from the database to individuals who are authorized under state law to receive the information for purposes of their profession.
2. Does the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) oversee PDMPs?
The DEA is not involved with the administration of any state PDMP.
3. What are the benefits of having a PDMP?
The overview provided by NAMSDL clearly identifies the benefits of a PDMP: as a tool used by states to address prescription drug abuse, addiction and diversion, it may serve several purposes such as:
1. support access to legitimate medical use of controlled substances,
2. identify and deter or prevent drug abuse and diversion,
3. facilitate and encourage the identification, intervention with and treatment of persons addicted to prescription drugs,
4. inform public health initiatives through outlining of use and abuse trends, and
5. educate individuals about PDMPs and the use, abuse and diversion of and addiction to prescription drugs.
4. Which states currently have a PDMP?
As of July 2010, 34 states have operational PDMPs that have the capacity to receive and distribute controlled substance prescription information to authorized users. States with operational programs include:
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Seven states (Alaska, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota and Wisconsin) and one U.S. territory (Guam) have enacted legislation to establish a PDMP, but are not fully operational.
*Washington State’s PDMP was operational but has been suspended due to fiscal constraints.
5. Are there other states that are planning to implement a PDMP?
Delaware has legislation pending to establish a PDMP.
6. Who can I contact regarding a PDMP in a specific state?
Each state designates a state agency to oversee its PDMP, which may include health departments, pharmacy boards, or state law enforcement. The Alliance of States with Prescription Monitoring Programs (www.pmpalliance.org) maintains a list of state contacts.
7. Where can I find state laws pertaining to prescription drug monitoring?
The National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws (www.namsdl.org) provides links to each state’s statutes and regulations regarding PDMPs.
8. Who can access the PDMP information collected?
Each state controls who will have access and for what purpose.
9. Is federal funding available for PDMPs?
There are currently two federal sources of funding for state PDMPs. The first is the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (HRPDMP) administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance. HRPDMP provides three categories of grants: planning, implementation, and enhancement. To be eligible for funding, the state must already have a statute or regulation permitting the establishment of a PDMP.
Since its inception in 2002, the HRPDMP has awarded over 100 grants for approximately $48 million. Congress allocated $7 million for fiscal year 2010 (FY10) for the grant program. Additional information can be found at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/prescripdrugs.html
The second source of federal funding is the National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting Act (NASPER) administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This grant program enables states to create a PDMP database or enhance an existing one. Congress appropriated $2 million in FY09 to implement NASPER. FY09 is the first year for which state grants were made available. Appropriations for FY10 grants are also $2 million.
10. What is the difference between HRPDMP and NASPER?
The purpose of the HRPDMP is to enhance the capacity of regulatory and law enforcement agencies as well as public health officials to collect and analyze controlled substance prescription data through a centralized database administered by an authorized state agency.
NASPER administers a grant program under the authority of HHS. The intent of the law was to foster the establishment or enhancement of PDMPs that would meet consistent national criteria and have the capacity for the interstate exchange of information.
u:112906, 120407,071708,110308, 112709,011510
Stalking and Cyberstalking – U.S. Federal Code
(1) travels in interstate or foreign commerce or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or enters or leaves Indian country, with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to, or causes substantial emotional distress to that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115) of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that person; or
(2) with the intent–
- (i) that person;
(ii) a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115  of that person; or
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person;
(A) to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or
(B) to place a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to–
uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress to that person or places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to, any of the persons described in clauses (i) through (iii) of subparagraph (B);  shall be punished as provided in section 2261(b) of this title.
(b) Penalties.– A person who violates this section or section 2261A shall be fined under this title, imprisoned–
- (1) for life or any term of years, if death of the victim results;
(2) for not more than 20 years if permanent disfigurement or life threatening bodily injury to the victim results;
(3) for not more than 10 years, if serious bodily injury to the victim results or if the offender uses a dangerous weapon during the offense;
(4) as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A (without regard to whether the offense was committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison); and
(5) for not more than 5 years, in any other case,or both fined and imprisoned.
(6) Whoever commits the crime of stalking in violation of a temporary or permanent civil or criminal injunction, restraining order, no-contact order, or other order described in section 2266 of title 18, United States Code, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year.